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 Executive Summary 
Policy makers continue to be concerned by the lack of integration in European retail 
banking. Regulatory harmonisation may reduce entry costs, but is unlikely to stimulate enough 
cross-border competition to bring visible consumer benefits. Competition that fosters real cross-
border integration is more likely to be triggered by an outsider that introduces qualitatively 
different services, business models and technologies to what is still a fairly static, concentrated 
market structure. This paper discusses the advantages and persistent challenges a new entrant 
would face if it were to attempt to develop a compelling cross border retail banking service in 
Europe.    
Given Brussels' stated preference for a market-led process of integration, single market 
policy should focus more on removing barriers to innovative new entrants than on efforts to 
harmonise rules based on existing business models.  Competition authorities should be supported 
in their investigations into regulatory and commercial restrictions on access to payment networks 
and systems. Further steps towards an EU supervisory authority may also help reduce regulatory 
uncertainty that weighs disproportionately on banks seeking to introduce new pan-European 
business models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  I. Introduction
 
 
Despite important advances in European financial market integration, visible
1 retail 
financial sector integration in Europe remains elusive. European Single Market policy aims, 
ideally via a market led process, to foster retail integration. In mature markets, particularly 
those dominated by a few firms, the best chance to foster integration often comes from a new, 
innovative entrant. European retail banking could benefit from new entrants that trigger cross-
border competition. This paper uses the example of a ‘Vodabank’ – a hypothetical initiative in 
retail banking by a mobile telephone operator - to illustrate the barriers, beyond regulation, 
that new entrants may face and to highlight what policy makers should do to facilitate this 
type of innovation and promote retail integration at the same time through market led forces.  
Within the context of European financial markets, there has admittedly been some 
progress: retail financial institutions are increasingly expanding across borders, establishing 
subsidiaries and branches abroad, acquiring foreign banks and pursuing mergers. But this has 
not as of yet led to the emergence of integration in the form of pan-European retail services 
that, as the Commission would like, can be used as “domestic” across the wider European 
market. The temptation to resort to regulation as a means to create at least the appearance of 
integration is rising. It is also dangerous and may risk ‘denying’ economic realities, creating 
distortions and perhaps only achieving superficial integration, the benefits of which accrue to 
incumbents and special interest groups. 
Competition that is able to foster integration often originates with market outsiders
2 
that introduce gains in variety, qualitatively different services or technologies that overcome 
market inertia and the advantages of incumbents. Their new services may be of interest only 
to a niche market and become commercially viable precisely because they can be marketed to 
a wider population, in an enlarged ‘integrated market’. More than integration to produce 
lower prices through an extension of one-size-fits-all services to a larger population, it is 
through an expansion of variety proposed by outsiders that the benefits of integration may 
manifest themselves most importantly. This ought to be the way in which European retail 
financial market integration is supported.  
                                                 
1 Behind the scenes, there already has been some integration at the production level, in particular for asset 
management and some form of outsourcing, such as for custody or IT systems administration. 
2 There is no lack of instructive case studies. Most spectacularly, mobile telephony has been the best remedy 
against monopolies in the fixed line business. MCI shook up the fixed line business itself by focusing just on 
long distance in the US once it gained access to the last mile via the AT&T network. Low cost airlines, starting 
with Freddy Laker, have been better than any regulations at diluting the power of duopoly power over passenger  
air traffic. Monopoly postal systems have been driven to reinvent themselves, not by regulation or privatisation, 
but by competition from the internet and from specialised parcel carriers such as FedEx and DHL.  
  1This paper outlines some of the hurdles, beyond regulation, to new entrants in retail 
financial services and discusses how Vodafone, as a pertinent example of an ‘outsider’, could 
be better placed than many banks to foster integration, in particular, if it were to lead the 
market in mobile banking. The chances of this happening are still slim, as the challenges to 
new entrants are significant. Established banks will be sure to try and manage the introduction 
of mobile banking services in their favour. Nevertheless, the “Vodabank” discussion herein 
should provide an instructive illustration of structural barriers that continue to restrain 
integration and competition in the retail banking sector – and provide reflections on how 
policy makers might best facilitate this. 
The paper addresses specific challenges to establishing what will be referred to as a 
Trans-European Bank Account (TEBA
3) and a corresponding market in retail banking 
services. A TEBA represents a particular vision of retail market integration. It would be a 
substitute for holding a set of separate domestic accounts in different European countries
4. Of 
course there are challenges to achieving this vision of integration, especially through a market 
led process. Not least, there are doubts concerning the real level of demand for a cross border 
retail offer that spans domestic markets. Secondly there are a number of general challenges to 
new entrants in the retail banking market that stem from the high up-front investments and 
network effects in the industry. Some of these are gradually being overcome by innovations in 
niche retail financial services and service delivery, but their full impact is still unclear. And 
there are other, perhaps more important, barriers to a TEBA market that relate to payment 
services. These are not only widely used by financial services themselves, but are also 
primary components of, and gateways to other retail financial services. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section defines different forms 
of integration and the idea of a TEBA. Thereafter, the paper outlines some of the reasons for 
high entry costs and network effects that dampen competition. It discusses the extent to which 
the significance of these barriers is being eroded or why they may be less relevant for 
Vodafone. The third section discusses the relevance of payment services in a TEBA offer and 
hurdles to competition in this area. It similarly illustrates the extent to which a hypothetical 
Vodabank service could provide a source of competition in payment services that fosters 
uptake of a TEBA. The penultimate section discusses policy implications of the hypothetical 
Vodabank analysis, before concluding. 
 
 
                                                 
3 No reference to the South African bank of this name is intended. 
4 Accounts with domestic banks are currently not good substitutes for accounts with banks in other countries. 
  2II. What form of integration for European retail banking? 
 
In general, and in the context of European retail banking, competition and integration 
are not the same thing. Recent forms of integration – such as cross border expansion - have 
helped to increase competition in individual domestic markets. But this has not necessarily 
contributed to the kind of European competition and integration that many seek to foster in 
which a bank account and retail service may be operated as ‘domestic’ across the EU. There 
are three principle forms of retail banking integration discussed herein that each hold out the 
prospect of increased competition and gains in consumer welfare
5. But the likelihood of these 
different forms of integration emerging – and the ease with which policy may facilitate their 
emergence – varies. In particular, the emergence of a TEBA, an account that can be used as 
domestic across Europe, may be the most difficult form of integration to achieve. 
 
Mode 3 integration The first type of integration, which is currently advancing most in 
Europe, comes in the form of foreign direct investment (or mode 3 trade under WTO 
terminology). Cross border mergers and acquisitions have led to the geographical 
diversification of retail banking groups
6. But their level of integration often stops at 
ownership, with operational structures and products remaining separated along national lines.  
 
Extended mode 3 A further degree of integration can be achieved if fixed investments 
by banks - such as in risk management, technology, processing and infrastructure - can be 
utilised to support business across multiple domestic markets. This is now the challenge for 
many retail banks that have already expanded their geographical presence (within Europe). 
This form of integration, if done well, should enable economies of scale to be exploited. 
Integration of this kind can be stimulated through advances in technology that make it easier 
to comply with various national market characteristics and greater flexibility in outsourcing 
components of service production. It may also be facilitated by harmonisation of, for 
example, rules, product standards and common infrastructure such as payment systems.  
 
                                                 
5 For a similar classification, applied to the financial sector more generally, see the European Commission’s 
Financial Integration Monitor 2004. Therein, the Commission distinguishes between (1) competition within 
national markets only, (2) multi-domestic markets with ownership links and (3) open and fierce competition on a 
pan-EU basis. 
6 Recent examples include expansion by Santander (purchase of Abbey in the UK), Unicredit’s acquisition of 
HVB, the expansion of Nordea across the Nordic region and the development of retail banking franchises in 
central and eastern Europe by foreign banks such as Societe Generale and Erste Bank.  
  3With sufficient competition, this form of integration could bring about important 
efficiency gains for the industry and welfare gains for consumers. It should at the very least 
enable suppliers to reduce the cost of providing efficient cross-border services. But integration 
of this type will not by itself stimulate cross border competition unless domestic banking 
accounts offered in one country become good substitutes for accounts held by banking clients 
in another country. 
 
Demand integration Lastly, the most complete form of integration would see the 
emergence of a retail banking account (a TEBA) that can be used like a domestic account 
across multiple European countries, although not necessarily all. A prerequisite for achieving 
this form of integration is a significant level of corresponding consumer demand. This type of 
consumer demand would most likely come from individuals that have significant private 
and/or business interests across more than one country and that already hold separate accounts 
in these different countries in order to fulfil their needs
7. Labour mobility is and will continue 
to play a crucial role in stimulating this form of demand. Only certain banks (with a 
complementary geographical presence) might be in a position to provide this TEBA service. 
They would compete with domestic banks in multiple countries for European clients and 
potentially trigger direct cross-border competition for retail banking services
8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 A study conducted on behalf of the Commission (Qualitative Study among cross-border buyers of financial 
services in the European Union) in 2003 identified 8 types of consumers with cross border use of financial 
services. The typology is reproduced in box 1. 
8 Competition authorities would have to ensure that a TEBA provider was unable to use residency requirements 
as a means to prevent individuals from opening an account with their branches abroad in order to find the best 
price.  
  4Box 1: Regional integration indicators via SWIFT data 
Top 3 destinations for SWIFT category 1 messages as % of total sent per originating country 
to recipients in other European* countries  (2004)
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SWIFT data can provide an overview of the volume of transactions between different countries, and hence some 
indication of the level of demand for cross-border transactions between banks on behalf of clients. The chart 
presents data on SWIFT message flows for category one, the vast majority of which represent inter-bank 
transfers of currency on behalf of clients (both consumer and business). The chart indicates the share of all 
outgoing messages of this type that the three biggest recipient countries represent as a proportion of all message 
sent by a given to country to the other fifteen within the sample. As an example: For all outgoing messages of 
this type sent in 2004 from institutions based in Austria, 56% went to German based institutions, another 12% to 
Italian banks and 11% to UK based institutions. As an indicator of cross border transfers on behalf of individual 
clients, the data give some indication of the importance of banking links between different countries in the 16 
selected European countries – EU 15 minus Greece, plus Norway and Switzerland.  
 
Progress towards any of the above forms of integration should be welcomed, although 
under certain circumstances they may raise particular issues for competition policy
9. This 
paper focuses on the hurdles that would have to be overcome for a new or existing bank to 
respond to (and help foster) the third form of integration – demand integration - by offering 
an economically viable TEBA. 
                                                 
9 In the presence of a small number of very large international banks that have established cross-country 
operations there may be benefits from economies of scale; smaller local banks may under such circumstances 
succumb to competition leaving a high market concentration in domestic markets - and significant market power 
in the hands of a few international banks. 
  5 
Box 2: Typology of Consumers of cross-border financial services  
  Historical Ownership: owners of financial services in another European country than their 
present country of residence – yet these services were not bought cross-border at the time 
they were acquired, but merely kept there when they moved; they are consumers with 
strong ties with that other country (including nationals of that country). 
 
  Temporary Ownership: profiles similar to “Historical Ownership”, except that the stays 
made abroad by consumers of this type were short (and generally planned to be short from 
the start), and their ties with the other country much less strong. 
 
  Mandatory Ownership: consumers whose cross-border purchase of finance services was 
imposed, or nearly imposed on them (most typically cross-border workers, people retired 
from employment in another country). 
 
  Cross-border hopping: consumers who are often border region dwellers having sporadic 
or relatively frequent but limited transactions in another country. 
 
  Split lives: typically, people owning a second home where they spend holidays in another 
European country, without having other strong connections with that country. 
 
  Dual bi-national lives: members of bi-national families and people really living 
permanently between two countries and have strong ties with both (for business or other 
reasons). 
 
  Occasional opportunist behaviours: consumers who “fell” one day upon an opportunity 
to acquire one or another financial service cross-border with interesting terms and 
conditions, rather than actively seeking the service of their own initiative. 
 
  Active border-free opportunist behaviour: people actively searching for best 
opportunities cross-border as well as in their domestic market – including through the 
internet. 
 
  Mobile professionals: Employees of pan-European countries may travel frequently across 
borders, sometimes being seconded abroad for extended periods, yet retain a need for 
banking services in their home country. Meanwhile, companies may be requested to or 
require split salary payments, local reimbursement of expenses, etc.  
Reproduced from Qualitative Study Among Cross-Border Buyers of Financial Services in the European Union, final 
report; OPTEM for the Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection, European Commission; supplemented 
also with further own research 
 
III. Defining the Scope for a TEBA
 
III.A. How big is the population of potential TEBA clients?
This is perhaps the critical question for any bank wondering whether a TEBA could be 
commercially viable. Probably the most likely consumers of a TEBA are people that actually 
have a need for banking services in multiple countries. It is difficult to estimate, but figures 
suggest that there are several million Europeans living and/or working abroad within the EU 
and hence more likely to be interested in a TEBA. Many more immigrants in European 
countries come from outside Europe or are economic migrants from within Europe, i.e. from 
  6less well off areas (such as Greece, Portugal, southern Italy). And figures suggest that as these 
countries’ economies have grown, the number of their citizens working in northern Europe 
has declined.  
OECD labour migration data provide an official view of residents abroad, which 
probably underestimates real numbers of cross-border workers and residents (see table 1 
below), because potential TEBA clients may include individuals that spend significant 
amounts of time in other EU countries without officially changing their residence (or 
registering with a local consulate) as well as individuals that have previously lived abroad, but 
have since returned to their home country.  For example, the French government estimates 
over one million French citizens resident abroad within western Europe (compared to about 
half that as official figures
10). The official numbers of French citizens registered in the UK 
was (in 1998) about 68 thousand; but the government estimates that a further 127 thousand 
non-registered (French) citizens are also resident in the UK. 
Table 1 
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A more forward looking indicator of labour mobility can be drawn from statistics on 
academic exchange via the ERASMUS
11 programme. Student mobility has been steadily 
growing. In the academic year 2003/04, roughly 20 thousand students from Spain, Germany 
and France (each) studied abroad within Europe (7.5 thousand for the UK and nearly 17 tsd 
from Italy). The total number of Erasmus students since 1988 has now reached over 1.2 
million. Students also represent an important target market for domestic retail banks for two 
reasons. Firstly, as clients tend not to change bank accounts often, it is especially important to 
attract them to open their first account and capture the prospect of a long and potentially 
                                                 
10 http://www.senat.fr/rap/r99-388/r99-3880.html 
11 The ERASMUS programme facilitates the pursuit of academic studies abroad within the European Union 
  7lucrative relationship
12. Secondly, given European demographics, youth represent one of the 
major sources of new demand for banking accounts. 
 
III.B. Key elements of a TEBA service 
For the purposes of this exposition, a TEBA is a bank account service that provides 
account holders with a set of basic financial services, but does not exclude the possibility that 
these may be part of a wider service. The vision of a TEBA integrated European retail 
banking market is reflected in the idea that (retail) account holders with, for example, a 
Swedish institution should be able to use their account for daily needs in, say, Germany or 
Spain, just as easily and cost effectively as they do for day to day needs in Sweden. A TEBA 
would respond to many if not all of the profiles outlined in the typology of cross-border 
clients (see Box 1) and overcome the problems cited in the following section, allowing a 
single account to be used instead of opening different ones per country. The TEBA would 
include use of the most basic functions of a bank account including those listed below. It 
could also extend to secondary banking services such as sophisticated investment or financing 
products.  
 
Box 3: Components of a basic TEBA service  
 
¾  safe store of value, “current account”  
¾  means to receive payments: salary, depositing of cheques or cash, funds transfers.  
¾  means to make  
  person-to-person payments (e.g. via cash withdrawals, cheques, remote transfers) 
  recurring or remote person-to-business payments (e.g. credit transfers, direct debits) 
  retail point of sale (POS) electronic payments (e.g. credit,debit card or substitute).  
¾  link to a credit card 
¾  issuance of account statements, compliance with local tax regimes for savings and investments, 
issuance of relevant documents for fiscal or other authorities 
¾  easy access to  
  a remunerated savings account 
  overdraft and other credit facilities 
  brokerage and safekeeping services for investments in securities or investment funds 
 
Some specific reasons why one might hold multiple accounts:  
As a substitute for holding multiple domestic accounts, A TEBA would have to 
respond to some of the hurdles consumers currently face when trying to use a bank account in 
this context. In addition to differences in pricing and perhaps the availability of country 
specific payment instruments, there remain many practical difficulties that encourage “cross-
                                                 
12 Most retail banks have introduced banking service packages marketed directly to potential clients in the age 
range from 18 to 25. Banks have also begun to focus on selling accounts to children (under 18s). 
  8border” consumers to open a local bank account. Some services simply do not work across 
borders; others are too expensive or slow. A sample of issues includes: 
 
¾  Direct Debits: as the ECB report on progress towards SEPA notes, direct debits are not 
even available at a pan-European level, in part for legal reasons. The creation of a pan-
European Direct Debit (PEDD) is a key objective within SEPA. Direct debits are widely 
used domestically for payment of recurring bills, such as for utilities. 
 
¾  Delays: although credit transfers can be made cross-border (and now at lower cost than 
before the Payments Regulation), they often involve delays that surpass those for domestic 
fund transfers. This is in part due to the fragmented nature of clearing and settlement 
systems for retail payments which operate on batch processes and to which not all banks 
are connected. Again, remedying this situation is a SEPA aim. 
 
¾  Lack of ease of use: Instructing a cross-border transfer of funds is often more difficult for 
consumers. Although now changing, banks often have separate transfer forms to be filled 
out for foreign transfers; these have rarely been available on-line or through automated 
tellers. And often consumers are required to provide the SWIFT IBAN code for the bank 
to which they want to send funds – but this piece of information is rarely familiar to 
clients nor available from local bank staff. 
 
¾  Paying salary to a foreign account: Not all employers will pay salary or other forms of 
remuneration to a foreign bank account (even within the Eurozone). According to surveys, 
this is even the case for some government institutions. And for those that do pay abroad, 
there may still be charges and delays to be born by the employee. The reasons for this 
unwillingness are unclear, but it seems that delays in cross-border transfers may be 
important in the context of national legislation stipulating maximum delays in payments to 
employees. Accounts abroad may also raise legal issues and risks: transfer of personal 
data may require checks and approvals; proof of receipt of salary and attempts to reclaim 
pay may be complicated by cross border differences in legal systems. 
 
¾  Currency issues: Although the introduction of the Euro has been a significant 
simplification for cross-border banking, banking with non-Eurozone countries still 
involves using multiple currencies and incurring exchange fees. Often payments and 
receipts are only accepted in one currency (sometimes by law). Hence different currency 
accounts may be a necessity for cross-border banking clients. Yet most retail banks do not 
offer multi-currency banking, or if so, accounts are not remunerated. 
 
¾  Local documentation needs: Banks often provide documentation – such as account 
statements or tax forms - required by public authorities or companies. They may be 
requested as a proof of address/residence, as proof of income or evidence of sufficient 
funds if entering, for example, a rental contract or for tax declarations. Foreign banks are 
not generally willing or able to produce this sort of documentation, compliant with foreign 
requirements. They are even less likely to be able to produce them in different languages.  
 
 
IV. New entrants to retail banking face network related costs of entry
 
New entrants to retail banking confront significant challenges even in a purely 
domestic environment, in particular due to economies of scale and network effects that apply 
to the industry. New entrants seeking to develop in a multi-national European environment 
  9can face even more acute problems because some portion of their fixed investments usually 
need to be duplicated for each additional domestic market that they aim to serve. Large up-
front investments hinder new entrants because they put them at a disadvantage compared to 
incumbents with a large existing client base. At low volumes and numbers of clients, new 
entrants suffer higher marginal and average costs. Recent developments in European retail 
banking display a number of aborted attempts to enter new markets – not for technical or 
regulatory reasons, but for simple business reasons: firms failed to recruit enough clients to 
cover their fixed costs
13.  
Retail financial services require heavy information technology investments. IT 
systems represent significant fixed costs for retail banks. And the investments can be 
important even if a bank is serving just a small numbers of clients. IT systems have 
increasingly enabled banks and other financial services providers to automate processes for 
large volume standardised services, increasing the role of economies of scale. New entrants 
may need to acquire a large number of clients before they are able to break even while 
charging competitive market rates.  
Establishing a branch network is important, but expensive. Branch networks are still 
important means of acquiring and serving clients, in particular for higher margin products for 
which clients still demand (or require) advice. And within a limited area, there may be 
increasing returns to branch network size – i.e. clients may be more inclined to choose a bank 
that has numerous branches in the areas in which they work and live.  
 
Table 2: property costs as a percentage of operating expenses for selected banking 
groups and countries 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Austria, all banks - 29% 30% 31% 32% 32% 32% 33%
France, large commercial banks 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% - -
France, savings banks 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% - -
France, cooperative banks 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Netherlands, all banks 8% 8% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 6%
Spain, cooperative banks 40% 41% 41% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42%
UK, commercial banks 22% 22% 22% 22% 19% 21% 24% 25%
source: OECD Bank Profitability Financial Statements of Banks
property costs as a percentage of total operating expenses 
 
The table above gives some indication of the costs of a branch network. Although the 
figures require careful interpretation due to the level of aggregation across activities beyond 
retail banking, it is worth noting that property costs can be a very significant proportion of 
total expenses. Also, these figures underestimate the costs of a branch network because they 
exclude expenses for branch staff. 
                                                 
13 There have been several examples of failed ‘de novo’ banks in Europe over the last ten years. First-E, an 
internet bank focused on UK and German clients was closed after less than three years in operation. Zebank in 
France was sold to Egg of the UK, which also withdrew after a short period of time; and internet based stock 
brokers and consumer credit operators have entered new markets only to withdraw shortly after: e.g. Comdirect, 
Fimatex and Cetelem in the UK, Avanza in Germany, Self Trade in Italy. 
 10 
Client acquisition can be slow and expensive. Acquiring clients is expensive, both in 
terms of time and money. Marketing costs can represent a significant portion of total costs 
during the early stages of development for a new financial services provider. The quicker a 
critical mass of clients can be acquired, the sooner a new operator can break even. Hence 
many foreign expansion strategies are based on a ‘stepping-stone’ model, building on existing 
networks or following other strategies associated with smaller up-front investments and lower 
risks; alternatively, expansion abroad is conducted through acquisition of an existing client 
base
14. 
But innovations are eroding these hurdles. For many types of financial services, the 
importance of some of these hurdles to new entrants has diminished.  Outsourcing, or a ‘plug-
and-play’ strategy is increasingly enabling financial services providers to add products and 
services to their offer that they do not manufacture themselves, or inversely (for wholesale 
financial services providers) to market their services through distribution partners that 
maintain the final relationship with the end-client. Advances in information technology and 
use of the internet have played an important role in facilitating this type of business strategy. 
And of course the last decade has brought even pure internet based financial services 
providers. Finally, the relative cost of IT systems and services –- has continued to decline 
while at the same time their capacity to serve multiple markets has increased. And as there are 
difficulties and costs associated with modernising or replacing legacy systems, new entrants 
in particular can benefit from these trends of declining IT costs and expanding outsourcing 
opportunities
15. 
 
V. Vodafone as a new entrant: building on an existing network
 
Vodafone has the means to minimise its fixed costs of entry.  Building on an existing 
multi-national client base and distribution network, Vodafone would be in a better position 
than many retail banks to develop cross-border retail banking in Europe and a TEBA 
                                                 
14 A complicating factor for acquisition in banking is that individual client accounts cannot be transferred to a 
new bank without consent. Acquirers must take over a legal entity with which clients hold accounts. This is one 
reason why opening branches abroad is less attractive compared to subsidiaries: in the event that a foreign 
venture does not succeed, a foreign subsidiary can be sold with client relationships intact, whereas a branch 
operation cannot be ‘sold off’ quite so easily while maintaining the value of existing client relationships. 
15 In so far as these two trends facilitate new bank entry and competition, liberalisation of trade in these services 
represents an important component of an overall strategy to facilitate competition and integration in the 
European financial sector. Reductions in trade barriers with India for these services may therefore be just as 
important (if not more so) as, say, legal harmonisation. 
 11service
16. It might also be in a better position than many banks to identify clients with a 
potential demand for a multi-national banking service. Although a lack of experience in this 
domain might favour the establishment of partnerships with banks, the illustration of how 
Vodafone alone could overcome some of the problems that also confront banks should be 
instructive. 
An existing client base. Most importantly perhaps, Vodafone already has an 
established retail client base across some of the largest European markets. Just taking the five 
key markets of the UK, Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands, Vodafone has a client 
base of about 75 million subscribers, over half of which are non-pre-paid clients
17. 
Transforming just 5 % of these into banking customers could give Vodafone a client base of 
over 2 million account holders. As a comparison with two of the financial services providers 
most widely present across Europe, GE has about 20 million clients across the whole of their 
European area (including Eastern Europe and Turkey) where they are present in over 20 
countries that together have a total population of about 750 million. This includes clients 
across a wide range of products including consumer loans, mortgages, retail banking and card 
services. Citibank, with a similarly wide geographical presence has between 2 and 3 million 
clients in the European area. Given the costs of client acquisition, Vodafone’s existing client 
base, brand recognition and market experience represents a potential head start in reaching 
critical mass.   
 
Table 3 
existing 
telephone 
clients
thereof: non 
pre-paid
potential 
clients at 1%
potential 
clients at 5%
DE 27 720 75% 208 1040
UK 15 489 39% 60 302
ES 11 840 48% 57 284
FR (SFR) 16 200 55% 89 446
NL 3 860 44% 17 85
Total 75 109 431 2 156
Vodafone client numbers in thousands
 
              source: Vodafone website and investor data 
 
An existing branch network. In addition to an existing client base, Vodafone could 
also benefit from its established branch network of outlets for mobile telephone customers. 
This already exists in multiple European markets (unlike for most existing retail banks) and 
could probably be used to develop a network of banking branches more quickly and cost 
effectively than a new entrant, and perhaps with fewer complications than for a bank 
acquiring a foreign network. The costs for a new entrant of acquiring or establishing a similar 
                                                 
16 Of course it is important to recognise the disadvantage of not having experience in retail banking. 
17 I assume that mobile phone pre-paid clients are less likely to be potential TEBA clients. 
 12network should not be underestimated. As noted above, property costs and the time spent 
finding and staffing locations can be a significant component of expenses for a retail bank and 
in particular for a new entrant.   
Advantages in technology. New generations of core banking systems exist that are 
capable of dealing more efficiently with multiple domestic markets and their different 
requirements. But the costs and complications of installing such systems are perhaps higher 
for incumbents who need to migrate existing functionality and clients than for a new entrant 
that does not have the burden of dealing with so-called ‘legacy systems’. This would apply to 
Vodafone. Additionally, Vodafone is likely to have its own core internal communication 
networks in place in the countries in which it operates and could perhaps expand upon them 
(more effectively than other potential entrants) to provide the back bone of an integrated 
multi-market technology platform. 
Are these advantages enough? With return on investment as a first priority, Vodafone 
may have other opportunities that are more attractive than helping to stimulate cross-border 
competition in retail banking. On the other hand, it is very difficult to judge how large a 
market share they could capture and how much scope there is to operate more efficiently than 
incumbents. The potential gains could be considerable, as many markets are dominated by 
just a handful of banks and competition is limited.  
One might assume that the absence of a TEBA service from existing banks is a sign 
that it is unlikely to be profitable. But Incumbents have limited if any interest in developing a 
TEBA type service for other good reasons. Firstly it would risk ‘cannibalising’ existing 
business. And even it a TEBA offer disproportionately attracted competitors’ clients, in most 
European countries, large banks may have little room to grow domestically without elevating 
market concentration to levels that attract unwanted attention from competition authorities. So 
offering a TEBA in order to capture domestic market share is probably not cost effective. It 
could even unleash intensified competition which, in an oligopolistic framework, could result 
in most of the big banks loosing revenue. Big banks are also unlikely to launch into foreign 
markets with a TEBA precisely for the reasons cited above, e.g. establishing or buying a 
branch network is expensive and risky.   
The success of a Vodabank venture would also depend on being able to provide 
efficient and perhaps novel payment services as a basic component of retail banking services. 
This is discussed in the following section. 
 
 
 13VI. Payment services and hurdles to European retail banking integration 
 
One of the key reasons why clients hold bank accounts at all is to have access to 
payments services and infrastructure. A bank account is usually a prerequisite to gaining 
access to payment facilities as well as engaging in other financial services. Hence retail 
payments services are a key to understanding why potential TEBA clients might (in the 
absence of a real TEBA) hold separate bank accounts in different countries – and what a 
TEBA would have to offer to be a competitive, commercially viable substitute for a set of 
domestic accounts. 
But as network based services, payment services and infrastructure display high levels 
of concentration and natural barriers to entry. Payments services offered by banks are largely 
based on common standards, infrastructure and suppliers, precisely to facilitate inter-bank 
settlement. In short, individual banks may have limited scope for price or service 
differentiation in this area. That is in part why banks try to differentiate retail offers through 
other characteristics (e.g. special rates on mortgages, insurance policies, loyalty points, 
interest free periods, etc.) and why they often bundle services. A TEBA based on existing 
payment systems and services might therefore struggle to compete with domestic accounts in 
this domain both on quality and price. The payments related hurdles to a viable TEBA are 
considerable, and hence an area in which an innovator might be necessary to help drive 
market integration. Again, Vodafone might be in a more favourable position than other 
potential entrants to overcome these hurdles.  
 
VI. A. Why are payment services so important?
Access to the payments network is a pre-requisite for purchasing almost any other core 
retail financial service today. It is virtually impossible to participate in today’s economy 
reliant only on cash as a medium of exchange and store of value
18. Without a “current 
account”, somewhere, at some bank, often one cannot even receive salary or other regular 
income, pay utility bills, withdraw cash at an ATM, or pay in a shop with a debit or credit 
card. To operate a loan or make investments, you may also need to have an account from 
which to initiate transactions
19. Use of the payments system is a prerequisite for other banking 
                                                 
18 Exceptions to this exist, such as driving across the border to Luxembourg with cash in hand to purchase 
physical certificates. Cash is also still important in the black economy and for economically very under-
privileged groups; but there have recently been attempts in countries such as France and the UK to make basic 
banking services available to everyone as a universal service. It is for example difficult to even receive 
unemployment or pension benefits without a bank account 
19 The importance of having a bank account has been highlighted by recent policy discussion in many countries 
regarding “financial exclusion” and pressure by governments on banks to ensure that all citizens have access to a 
 14services, but the reverse is not true. In order to put money on a savings account or invest in a 
mutual fund, one needs a current account through which to channel funds. However, one does 
not need any particular savings or credit product in order to operate a basic giro or current 
account.  
Evidence from surveys indicate that for most clients of cross-border financial services, 
a bank account is the most common product held and is often combined, perhaps as a 
prerequisite, with other products and services (such as a loan or credit card)
20. The price and 
quality of payment services could be decisive features in competition for this small group of 
consumers with a demand for a multi-national European retail bank account. 
 
VI. B. A TEBA provider would need to accommodate diverse payment instruments
Clients holding accounts in different countries often do so because they need efficient 
access to local payment instruments – and foreign banks do not provide this; there may (in 
addition to other factors) be differences between domestic payment services and pricing. 
In a European cross-border context, a TEBA provider would face demand for different 
types of payment instruments and diverging usage patterns across countries. Although it 
might not have to support all instruments (e.g. cheques), competition with domestic offers 
would force a TEBA provider to carefully consider which instruments, if any, not to support. 
Table 4 below provides an overview of different usage patterns in Germany, France and the 
UK. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
bank account, however basic its functionality. Pensions and social benefits often cannot be received without a 
bank account. 
20 See the Qualitative Study Among Cross-Border Buyers of Financial Services”, European Commission 
 15Table 4 
 
France Germany UK
Cheque 3928 133 2251
% of total non-cash 30% 1% 19%
Debit Card 4342 1670 3364
% of total non-cash 33% 13% 28%
Credit Card nav 583 1822
% of total non-cash - 4% 15%
Direct Debit 2353 5252 2430
% of total non-cash 18% 39% 20%
Credit Transfer 2587 5692 2213
% of total non-cash 20% 43% 18%
Total (excluding 
electronic money) 13210 13330 12080
Cash in circulation 
(as percent of GDP)(a) 2,0% 3,3% 3,3%
ATM transactions 
(2003) 1245 3270 2373
a: F, DE:2001;UK:2003
 payment instrument usage (2003) selected EU countries
in millions of transactions
 
          Source : ECB Blue Book 
 
The divergent patterns of use of payment instruments in these countries certainly have 
something to do with historical coincidence – i.e. it seems unlikely that they reflect 
fundamental differences in consumer preferences. But once established, these patterns of use 
are often hard to displace because of consumer habits as well as network effects. The benefits 
of using a particular payment instrument depend in part on how widely it is accepted.   
 
VI. C. Payment Service Requirements and Challenges
There are three basic payments facilities that a new entrant would need to provide – and 
three corresponding industry structures with which a new entrant would either need to 
cooperate or coordinate. All of them are subject to strong network effects that favour market 
concentration and present important challenges to new entrants seeking to compete in 
domestic markets or propose a TEBA solution.  The payment services that a new entrant 
would need to provide would require solutions for: 
¾  Inter-bank transfers 
¾  Electronic retail Point of Sale payments 
¾  ATM cash withdrawals 
 
Each of these areas is discussed in turn, highlighting current structures and barriers to 
entry.  The following section then discusses advantages that Vodafone might have in 
 16overcoming some of these hurdles, as well as noting persistent challenges. A notable omission 
from this list is cheques. These are still used in several European countries. It is open to 
debate whether their absence from a TEBA would significantly dissuade consumers from 
opening a TEBA. But it is also possible that new mobile person-to-person (P2P) solutions 
could provide a good substitute for cheques in many cases where they are used today. 
 
VI.C.1 Inter-bank payments 
Any form of funds transfer between account holders at different banks requires direct 
or indirect links between banks for the purpose of settling claims. For a new entrant in the 
retail banking sector, solutions for inter-bank payments - both domestic and international - 
would be indispensable; and the options open to a new entrant would be largely constrained 
by existing market structures.  
In a domestic context, banks settle claims between each other through clearing houses, 
either as direct participants themselves or via a correspondent relationship with a direct 
member. Settlement usually takes place via accounts held at central banks, through 
correspondent banks that themselves are direct members of clearing systems, or through 
banks that form the hub of independent clearing systems. Most countries have a very limited 
number of clearing arrangements, and each is usually specialised in particular kinds of 
payments (e.g. low value retail, or high value time sensitive transfers). For international 
transfers, banks may operate through networks of correspondent banks
21 or, in Europe, settle 
via one of the emerging clearing houses run by the Euro Banking Association: Euro1, Step1, 
Step2
22.  The choices for a new entrant are limited, although a bank with operations in 
multiple countries may have scope to internalise cross-border fund transfers for account 
holders.  
There are good reasons for this concentration. The benefits of working with a 
particular settlement network derive in large part from the number and scope of other banks 
(i.e. potential transaction partners) directly or indirectly in the network with which one can 
settle transactions. And there are economies of scale for these networks, so they have an  
interest in maximizing the volume of transactions processed through them. Maintaining 
accounts with multiple banks domestically or across Europe can be expensive and time 
consuming. It saps liquidity from banks, imposes counterparty risks and may require 
                                                 
21 Groups of commercial banks in Europe operate networks for international transfers. One such system groups 
savings and postal banks (Eurogiro), another is composed of mutual banks (TIPANET) and others are based on 
links between commercial banks, e.g. UniCash Alliance, IBOS Association.  
22 The European Banking Association is a member owned operator of clearing systems. Members comprise a 
wide number of European and international banks. 
 17heterogeneous systems, standards and operations. Hence clearing houses which provide a 
secure, harmonised and centralised forum for exchange can be an efficient solution for most 
banks and their customers, even if it implies strong market concentration. 
For new entrants that may want to propose new and innovative or less costly services, 
market concentration, i.e. limited competition and variety in these up-stream industry 
solutions, may impose constraints. In particular there may be minimum settlement periods set 
by clearing systems, minimum prices and limits in terms of technical and functional 
innovations. Governance and ownership structures as well as membership rules may also limit 
competition. 
Governance and ownership structures may impede new entrants if there is a conflict of 
interest between existing members and new applicants. Members of payments systems 
cooperate with each other for clearing and settlement, but they may compete with each other 
in other related domains of retail banking, in particular if they operate in the same domestic 
market. A new entrant that risks posing a challenge to common practices and product 
standards may confront subtle or even more overt challenges to membership and resistance to 
calls for changes to member owned clearing systems that would require investments by all 
participants, yet disproportionately provide benefits to the new entrant.  
Entry and membership fees, rules and conditions related to clearing systems may all 
have an impact on the success of new entrants. Some conditions may be onerous, making it 
economically less attractive for new retail banking competitors to become direct members. 
But it is often very difficult to determine whether conditions are discriminatory or not. For 
example, are volume discounts on transaction fees discriminatory? must members be locally 
regulated and authorised banks? Is membership of a retail settlement system conditional on 
membership of a related wholesale system? Direct members may have to make significant 
investments in proprietary software and systems in order to be compliant with operations and 
risk management standards. Many such conditions can perhaps be justified on economic or 
prudential grounds. Whether their benefits on balance outweigh the impediments they may 
create for new entrants needs to be assessed on a case by case basis.  
Similarly, new entrants seeking to introduce innovations to retail banking payment 
services may be unable to persuade other members to undertake collective investments. And 
even if they were to succeed in such lobbying, the process itself could force the new entrant to 
divulge sensitive business plans and other information to its future competitors. This might be 
a sufficient disincentive to lobby for changes at all. 
 18Any limitations on payment functionality must be evaluated in relation to the scope 
that banks do have for differentiation; and direct costs must be seen in proportion to internal 
payments systems costs. But in general, the nature of collective clearing systems and scope 
for downstream innovation and service differentiation remain areas of concern to policy 
makers. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK recently highlighted this latter concern 
in its report on UK payment systems (May 2003), noting that retail innovation and the 
flexibility it requires depends on the level of collective innovation by members of a clearing 
system.  
 
VI.C.2 Electronic Point of Sale (POS) payments:  
For consumers, solutions for electronic or non-cash retail payments are perhaps one of 
the most important components of a banking service
23. They also represent important services 
to businesses in the retail trade (merchants). The market for non-cash retail payments is 
dominated by the two major international card networks (Visa and MasterCard), although 
important shares are also held by other card schemes (e.g. American Express), store cards, 
and cheques. Card payments services are subject to strong and complex network effects that 
make it difficult for a new entrant to retail banking to develop a competitive alternative. 
Membership of or compatibility with existing schemes might be a prerequisite for competing 
in retail banking. But this might reduce options for differentiation and innovation necessary 
for the success of a TEBA. 
A TEBA based on existing card networks would leave limited scope for 
differentiation. To the extent that consumers choose between competing retail offers on the 
basis of retail payment services, scope for and competition from a new entrant and TEBA 
provider would be limited by the contractual and service arrangements from the two dominant 
card providers. Visa and MasterCard are – in spite of some differentiation – considered to be 
very close substitutes
24. This is not to say that card issuers or merchant acquirers have no 
scope for service differentiation. But it does mean that banks may be inclined to seek 
differentiation in other areas and to market payment cards as part of an overall retail service. 
Hence it would seem unlikely that a new entrant to the market would be able to derive a 
competitive advantage from existing card services and use this as an argument to attract 
clients away from purely domestic offers. This is all the more so since variable costs to 
consumers for cross-border Eurozone card payments have been virtually eliminated.  
                                                 
23 Credit and debit card services go beyond simple payments, including for example, fraud and theft insurance 
and interest free payment periods. 
24 See the Report prepared by Retail Banking Research for the Commission 
 19Firstly, existing card arrangements set out rules and regulations that impose a basic 
pricing structure, based on interchange fees. Following a case brought to the European 
Commission, Visa now publishes its charges and in principle sets them on the basis of 
underlying costs. Even if this still leaves some scope for pricing variation, the framework set 
by card networks generally accounts for a very large percentage of total fees charged by banks 
to merchants.  
Secondly, governance and ownership structures may also be restrictive. New 
developments (e.g. functionality, technology improvements) are likely to require agreement 
between members – who are both often users and owners. A new entrant dependent on 
innovations for its success would probably find it difficult to persuade other card members to 
invest in changes that yielded only limited if any benefits to them. Alternatively, if 
technological innovations benefited all members (a form of positive spill-over), the initiator 
might be reluctant to invest in the project unless a portion of the benefits to third parties could 
be secured. 
Governance structures also, perhaps not surprisingly, forbid member banks from 
operating their own competing card systems, creating a conflict of interest
25. Hence a new 
entrant would be unable to combine a proprietary payment network with a Visa or 
MasterCard service to enable transactions with parties outside its own network. Cross-border 
payments and withdrawals in Europe are well supported by the two dominant card networks. 
A TEBA provider focused on the cross-border market would risk direct competition with 
them. 
Alternatively, there has certainly been speculation that mobile operators in general 
could cooperate with retail banks to provide payments services and additional access to 
banking facilities, standardised across the industry. This may still happen if one or more 
banks see it in their interest to lead the way. Alternatively, in highly concentrated banking 
markets, and perhaps where banking and the retail sector are intertwined, there may be less of 
a disincentive to innovation posed by positive spill-overs being captured by competitors. But 
for most retail banks, the introduction of mobile access is likely to be part of a defensive 
strategy, responding to competitors. Partnering with mobile operators would put retail banks 
at risk of weakening their relationship with clients. So retail banks with a secure domestic 
market are unlikely to have an incentive to be too helpful in facilitating the entry of a mobile 
competitor. Retail banks themselves may also see little financial advantage in providing 
                                                 
25 The new European Directive on payment services in the internal market may force open access even under 
these circumstances. Although there is room for varying interpretations of the clause, it states that “payment 
systems may not impose [ ] a ban on participation in other payment systems” (Article 23) 
 20mobile access, unless it is done as a defensive measure, as was the case often for internet 
banking access. It is most likely to be small and emerging banks that seek to capture retail 
market share by partnering with a mobile operator.  
Although it may be tempting to see existing card networks as impediments to 
competition, policy makers have increasingly begun to recognise that many of their 
commercial and legal features (e.g. interchange fees, honour all cards rules) are not only a 
matter of good business. Imposing restrictions on them may not only fail to facilitate more 
competition but also result in less efficient outcomes for consumers
26. The network features of 
payment solutions determine to a large extent the structure of the industry, and this may 
unfortunately imply that there are natural barriers to entry that policy makers find 
unattractive, but for which they may be unable to develop efficient improvements. It is worth 
noting in this context the ease with which travellers can now access funds and pay bills 
around the world using a credit card. This represents in itself a significant advance in 
consumer financial services trade and a benefit that authorities would be wise not to put at 
risk through inefficient regulation.  
But a new, independent POS service would be hard for a TEBA provider to build. 
One way of getting around the dominance of existing card systems would be to create an 
independent alternative for electronic POS payments, allowing a new entrant greater scope to 
compete on quality, services and pricing. But the prospects for doing this are not great either. 
It is hard to compete with existing card payment organisations for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, card schemes benefit from significant network effects, whereby the benefits of 
using a specific payment scheme increase disproportionately with the number and variety of 
subscribers. A new payment instrument may not be able to attract any significant number of 
customers at all if it cannot achieve a wide degree of acceptance by retailers early on in its 
development. But by definition, a new and developing service must start out with a relatively 
low degree of acceptance. 
More precisely, card service network effects are of a special kind, an example of so-
called two-sided markets, in which client acquisition is hindered by a kind of ‘catch 22’ 
situation. There are two types of users of the service – consumers and retailers – whose 
benefits from the service are dependent on each other
27. In order to convince consumers to 
join, they need to be assured that the payment instrument will be widely accepted by 
                                                 
26 In a recent paper on Spanish regulation, Arrunada claims that price restrictions on MIF may reduce incentives 
for banks to a point where mutual acceptance of cards by different issuers and acquirers may break down, 
leading to a lower quality of service and perhaps more market power for incumbents. 
27 There is also arguably a third side to the market. Banks themselves are probably willing to subsidise core 
payment services in order to gain privileged access to clients in order to market other financial services to them. 
 21merchants. But to convince merchants to accept the instrument, they need to be convinced 
that there are large numbers of consumers out in the market that will seek to pay with it. Both 
types of users need to be recruited to the service simultaneously for either to benefit from it. It 
is not sufficient for a new entrant to have an advantage in recruiting just consumers or just 
merchants; they must have a successful strategy for acquiring both relationships. In practice 
this can be a big challenge 
A consequence of these two features is that a new payment provider may be forced to 
cooperate with competitors in order to achieve widespread acceptance for their payment 
instruments. In particular, a new entrant would need to develop partnerships with merchant 
acquirers, most of whom today are also card issuers for other schemes, and hence retail 
banking competitors. They may be reluctant to ‘acquire’ for a payment instrument that they 
(1) cannot issue and earn revenue on and (2) helps a competitor to advance its own market 
position. 
It is perhaps no coincidence therefore that the two major card networks are 
independent organisations, whose members are banks, but which are not owned and operated 
by any one particular bank. This sort of structure helps to circumvent conflicts of interest 
between banks. Existing card networks enforce mutual acceptance of cards (honour all cards 
rule) issued by all member banks, thus achieving a very wide scope of acceptance
28.  A new 
entrant seeking to ensure widespread acceptance of its own independent retail payment 
scheme would face a conflict of interest with other retail banks, especially those that issue 
cards from competing systems. Hence, a new entrant might find it particularly helpful to 
develop partnerships with non-issuing merchant acquirers
29. Otherwise it might be difficult to 
advance a bank owned payment instrument in combination with a retail banking service.    
A new POS service would in addition to these numerous challenges have to compete, 
for example, on price or quality. Given the interdependence between consumers and 
merchants, it is essential that new entrants exercise some degree of control over price and 
quality proposed to both sides of the market in order to ensure the commercial viability of the 
service as a whole. The following sections outline some of the ways a new entrant might 
compete for the custom of these two sides of the market. 
 
                                                 
28 Sometimes the merchant acquirer bank is the same as the issuing bank for a given card presented to a retailer; 
in this case the transaction is referred to as ‘on us’. Alternatively, the issuing and acquirer banks are different; 
this is an ‘on them’ transaction.  
29 Visa used to operate a “no issuing without acquiring rule”, ensuring that all acquiring banks were also issuers 
of visa cards. This rule was removed by Visa in January 2005. This rule had been previously the subject of a 
Commission case concluded in 2001 (case no comp/29.373) which found that its impact on limiting competition 
was not significant.  
 22Competing for retail consumers 
Room for price competition is limited. An efficient new entrant might try to induce 
potential clients to adopt their payment instrument by charging a lower price than existing 
competitors. Or as part of a comprehensive TEBA offer, other services might be combined 
with the payment instrument to create an overall attractive product. But price competition for 
card holders can be quite severe. In many European countries, payment cards are offered for 
free or even charged at negative rates through the use of loyalty points
30. In other countries 
yearly or monthly fees generally remain low and fees per transaction are very rare, at least in 
a domestic setting
31. And fees for using a card abroad (at least within the Eurozone) have 
declined to the level of domestic fees, probably under pressure from regulators.  
There is probably also significant scope in countries with higher fees for cards to 
engage in price competition (directly or through incentives)
32. Some may even be willing to 
subsidise payment services in order to preserve the client relationship for the other sources of 
revenue that it provides. Banks that hold a client’s main account have a privileged position to 
understand client needs and market other services. 
 
                                                 
30 Indirectly, banks continue to collect revenue on interest rate spreads. Hence one may argue that account 
holders indirectly pay for card services even if nominal fees are zero or negative.  
31 Some commercial offers with a lower annual or monthly fee set an limit on the number of free transactions per 
period, above which a variable fee is incurred by users. 
32 Where consumers are able to negotiate rates below those published, this is an indication that banks maintain 
scope for price reductions..  
 23Box4: Comparative card service revenues in selected European countries 
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 24Competing for merchants 
More scope here for lower priced services, but merchants are not very price 
sensitive. Most revenue for card payment services come from fees levied on merchants. A 
portion of this is kept by the merchant acquirer bank – the bank or other institution that 
provides card processing to the retailer. Some may go to a non-bank payments processor. The 
rest is allocated to the issuing bank (the bank having issued the card to the customer) in the 
form of “interchange fees” or to the card network operator itself
33. A new entrant could try to 
gain a share of merchants through lower fees than competing card networks and acquiring 
banks, but merchants would be unlikely as a result to cease to accept payment by Visa or 
MasterCard.  A competing POS payment instrument would have to operate as a complement 
to existing services. 
On this side of the market it is also difficult for a new entrant to compete just on price. 
One of the odd consequences of this two-sided market is that competition between networks 
can potentially push prices up. Increased competition between card schemes may for example 
induce issuers to provide added incentives (such as loyalty points) to consumers to use their 
cards. The resulting increase in costs may be borne by merchants. Retailers may be relatively 
insensitive to price changes if they fear that refusal to accept widely held payment cards 
would result in a significant drop in sales
34. To the extent that loyalty and other incentive 
schemes induce consumers to hold and use cards, merchants may be willing to accept higher 
charges. Hence the direct costs of added benefits to card holders may end up being borne by 
merchants (indirectly of course, these are likely to be passed back to consumers in the form of 
higher retail prices). Under such circumstances, a new entrant may find that price competition 
is not sufficient to persuade merchants to accept their new payment instrument or to capture 
demand from existing networks. 
Once a POS instrument provider has achieved wide acceptance by merchants, 
revenues – and commercial viability - will depend on usage patterns by consumers. Choice of 
instrument by consumers can depend on various factors. Loyalty points and delayed payment 
periods can be important positive incentives for clients to use a card. Merchants on the other 
hand have traditionally had only very limited scope (if any) to influence consumers’ 
decisions
35. In many countries, a so-called no-surcharge rule prevents retailers from charging 
                                                 
33 Estimates of inter-change fees in Europe range, for credit cards, from 2.5% in Greece to .7% in France and for 
debit transactions from 2.1% in Poland to .67% of the transaction value in Italy. See www.psel.co.uk for industry 
surveys. But they can also vary by industry, as research in Spain indicates. Arruñada cites data from the Bank of 
Spain that show a range of between 2.98% for “massages” to 0.7% for department stores. 
34 For retailers with significant local market power, this consideration may be less important. 
35 One common exception is the use of minimum amounts below which merchants refuse to be paid by card. 
 25different prices to consumers according to the payment instrument by which they choose to 
pay
36. And even where no-surcharge rules have been outlawed or are not imposed, 
surcharging has remained limited and merchants seem to have been hesitant to introduce 
differential pricing. Store cards do however propose ‘loyalty points’ that can act as an 
incentive for consumers to use the retailer’s card instead of an independent credit card. New 
entrants may find that scope for price competition is relatively limited.  
There are some areas though on which a new entrant might try to compete and 
differentiate its service from others. For merchants, technology, accounts management, fraud 
prevention and insurance and support for loyalty schemes may all be important factors in their 
choice of service provider. Consumers could be attracted as with other providers by loyalty 
points. Perhaps in the case of Vodafone, credits could be accumulated towards telephone 
calls. 
 
VI.C.3 Automated Teller Machine (ATM) network access 
A further requirement for a new entrant offering a TEBA would be to provide access 
to cash withdrawals at ATMs. A new retail bank could invest in its own network of ATMs, 
but it would be impossible to match the level of access provided by existing banks through 
their own and through associated ATM networks at home and abroad. 
In seeking to ensure widespread access to ATMs, a new entrant would face challenges 
very similar to those discussed above regarding card payment solutions. This is because most 
international access to ATMs is arranged through agreements with the major card networks 
(e.g. Cirrus MasterCard, Visa Plus). In a purely domestic context, access to ATMs is arranged 
through other similar inter-bank relationships (e.g. LINK in the UK, Cashgroup in Germany). 
If a new entrant and TEBA provider wanted to ensure wide access to ATMs, it would 
probably need to enter into agreement with one or more of these existing networks. The 
alternative would be to develop partner relationships with one or more ATM operator per 
country. This could be attractive for a strategic partner in the banking industry. But some 
banks might be reluctant, fearing this would facilitate competition from the new entrant for a 
similar client base.  
New entrants are also constrained by the need to provide instruments (generally cards) 
that are compatible with existing ATM technology and standards. For a new technology, such 
as that based on mobile telephones, to be rendered compatible with ATMs, some form of 
investment would probably be required – not only by the new entrant but also by existing 
                                                 
36 MasterCard has reportedly removed its “no discrimination” rule, allowing merchants to surcharge. 
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disproportionately to the new entrant. Incumbents may also fear that this would facilitate the 
growth of the new entrant, fostering unwanted competition. This conflict of interest is likely 
to retard any competing technology from achieving ATM compatibility. So a new entrant 
would probably be forced to use existing card technology and standards dominant in the 
industry.  
The dominant use and compatibility of cards and ATMs sets a very high hurdle for the 
emergence of new technologies that could in theory be technologically more attractive 
instruments. But on the other hand, it must be remembered that card technology and ATM 
standardisation can also be seen as an advantage for new entrants. The fact that plastic cards 
can generally be used – technically – so widely internationally in ATMs across the world can 
be considered a major achievement in harmonisation of industry standards and trade 
facilitation. For new and existing retail banks, this level of compatibility facilitates life for 
clients, providing a single instrument that can be used at home and abroad for cash 
withdrawals at an ATM. 
 
VII. VODAFONE AS A NEW ENTRANT: OVERCOMING HURDLES IN PAYMENT SERVICES 
 
Given the network features of most payment services, a Vodabank service would be 
very hard pressed to develop a business model without some degree of reliance on or 
coordination with existing structures for inter-bank settlement, card networks and ATMs. 
Also, compared internationally, existing retail banking competition in Europe is still relatively 
strong and efficient, so the success of a new entrant such as a Vodabank would still require 
significant effort
37. But there are some advantages that Vodafone has that might facilitate their 
launch into pan-European retail banking – and more importantly from a policy perspective – 
trigger cross border competition.  
 
Overcoming the catch 22 
Firstly, Vodafone would have an advantage in overcoming part of the ‘catch 22’ that 
hampers development of a new retail payment instrument: in so far as mobile phones can be 
easily adapted to provide payment facilities, merchants can be confident that a Vodafone 
payment instrument would be widely held by consumers early on in its development phase. In 
                                                 
37 It is precisely because of the well developed payment structures in Europe that mobile based banking services 
have to date been most successful in developing markets where retail banks have less dominance over banking 
structures and clients habits and where there are still large numbers of ‘unbanked’ clients whose main alternative 
is cash. 
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the groups of people that a TEBA provider would target. This would at least solve half of the 
problem of client acquisition. 
For the other half of the market – merchants – Vodafone would perhaps need to 
develop a partnership with merchant acquirers to ensure that retailers would accept payment 
via the new instrument. Merchants could be proposed attractive fee levels. And as a TEBA 
provider, there could be important scope for ‘value added services’ from merchant acquirers 
working with Vodafone for pan-European retailers. Insofar as the growth of outsourcing to 
specialist merchant acquirers continues, these kinds of partnerships are more likely to 
emerge
38.  
 
Real time retail settlement 
A second attraction for customers - both individuals and companies - could be the 
introduction of real time transfers for clients both holding Vodabank accounts. 
Technologically this is possible, especially if a bank is starting out with a new generation of 
banking systems. Risk management, particularly for in-house systems has improved. Real 
time settlement exists already in wholesale markets but has not been extended to retail clients, 
except in a few cases, such as an in Finland
39 and more widely for ‘day traders’. The currently 
standard delays to accessing funds transferred between banks and accounts is probably one of 
the features of retail banking that consumers least appreciate. With mobile phones almost 
always accessible, clients could receive messages almost in real time confirming debits, 
credits and account balances without having to access the internet
40.   
 
Constant remote access 
Thirdly, access: A mobile based instrument providing direct access to accounts would 
expand ease of use for clients. They would have quick and easy access to make account 
transfers without having to log on to the internet, go to a bank or find an ATM. The ‘ease of 
use’ advantages could be significant. Past experiences with mobile telephone access to, for 
example, trading accounts suffered from slow connections and awkward screen navigation. 
But improvements are almost certain to come. Some mobile operators have already achieved 
success with very simple solutions. And the simpler transactions of credits and debits 
(compared to share trading) may be better adapted to telephone use.  
                                                 
38 Recent outsourcing announcements include the agreement between HSBC and First Data as well as the sale by 
Citibank of its card processing to Eurconex, owned by a US banking group. 
39 See Milne and Tang 
40 The Vodafone experimental service in Kenya (Mpesa) already in effect provides real time transfers.  
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ones. Holders of accounts with Vodabank could transfer funds between each other without the 
need for a cheque or more time consuming processing on-line or in a bank. Visa and Paypal 
have already demonstrated that there is some demand for more efficient cross border 
electronic P2P transfers. And mobiles have the advantage of allowing immediate notification 
of the recipient, which can facilitate a kind of Delivery versus Payment (DVP) without cash. 
It is also particularly of interest to providers of remittance services (see Box 4), as telephone 
based accounts can reach a much wider population in rural and developing regions than 
traditional bank branches allow. More generally, real time P2P transfers could be, in early 
stages, a novelty service that attracts clients. 
 
Internal netting across borders 
Although Vodafone would need to operate through existing clearing systems for 
settlement with other banks, costly international fees could perhaps be avoided by maximising 
scope for internal netting. This is not an advantage that would be unique to Vodafone. Banks 
with significant operations in multiple countries may engage in internal netting as well. But a 
Vodabank solution developed in parallel in several European countries might have a volume 
and balance of cross border activity that would warrant looking carefully at potential cost 
savings from netting opportunities. 
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Box 5: Commercial Developments in mobile phone based payment instruments 
Although the recent past is littered with failed mobile payment initiatives, there are signs that some 
viable business models are beginning to emerge. Banks and mobile operators are beginning to 
experiment in Europe with solutions that go beyond alternatives just for low value payments and are 
integrated with full banking services. And real progress on this front may be achieved more quickly in 
developing markets with larger pools of un-banked clients. Several initiatives are advancing in Africa 
and Asia, in countries and populations where a relative lack of competition with alternative electronic 
payment forms (such as cards) potentially means there are lower barriers to new entrants.  
 
PostFinance, Switzerland: The Swiss postal bank has been testing a mobile phone POS solution, 
developed with Unisys, called Yellow Account. The mobile phone is scanned by new POS technology 
that registers the user’s telephone number. The customer uses a pin code typed into the telephone to 
allow their account balance and transaction limit to be checked. A text message containing an 
alphanumeric code is then scanned by the merchant to complete the transaction. 
 
SMART Padala remittances, Philippines: Smart Communication in the Philippines has developed a 
solution for mobile based remittance services. It allows migrant workers in, for example Hong Kong, 
to deposit money with an agent and send funds using a text message to a recipient with a mobile 
account in the Philippines, on which the units are credited; the account holder and beneficiary of the 
transfer can cash in the mobile units at SMART retail outlets. 
 
Mobipay, Spain:  An initiative jointly owned by BBVA and Telefónica Móviles, enables consumers 
to pay for purchases by confirming a transaction message sent to their mobile telephone. Merchants 
are provided with a telephone number, alias or bar code and then send a message to the phone holder 
for confirmation using a PIN code typed into the key pad. The technology and model has been 
patented across a wide number of countries. 
 
MTN and Standard Bank have together developed a cellular phone based bank account called a 
MobileMoney transactional account. The account enables a wider scope of the South African 
population to access a bank account using their mobile phone. Banking transactions and account 
statements via SMSs are free. All customer-initiated transactions (e.g. card and/or ATM transactions) 
are notified in real-time, irrespective of the day and time. MobileMoney also enables person-to-person 
payments and transfers to other bank accounts and credit cards and bill payments.  
 
M-Pesa, Kenya: Vodafone has been testing a mobile banking solution in Kenya in cooperation with 
local microfinance institutions (MFI) that provide loans to clients who would otherwise have no 
banking relationship at all. Loans can be credited directly to the client’s account with Vodafone using 
messaging via SMS. Clients can then use their mobile phone and pin code to withdraw money from 
retail outlets that sell pre-paid air-time for Vodafone. Clients can also deposit money with these 
agents. All transfers and balances can be confirmed directly through simple SMS based messaging and 
the use of a PIN code 
  
 
 30VIII. Policy considerations
 
Retail banking integration in Europe continues to be an important objective for policy 
makers. This has given rise to a variety of legislative and other policy initiatives including 
attempts to harmonise the legal frameworks for retail products and efforts to foster investment 
in infrastructure for a new single European payments area (SEPA). In parallel, in Europe as 
well as the US and Australia, authorities have continued to be concerned by competition 
policy issues in payment services - especially credit cards.  
This section assesses some of the current policy issues in these areas in light of the 
barriers that a Vodafone based TEBA scenario would face. It also discusses other areas in 
which public authorities could take steps or investigate potential to facilitate competition, new 
entrants and integration in retail banking.    
 
VIII. A. The Single European Payments Area (SEPA) 
Public pressure on the banking community to forge a single European payments area 
has been mounting. Under a broad definition, the SEPA project encompasses a number of 
initiatives including the cross border payment Directive, the proposal for a new legal 
framework for payments and payment services providers and cooperation with the banking 
community to foster the development of pan European Clearing Houses (PEaCH) and 
services.  The underlying objective is to create a structure in which intra-European (or at least 
Eurozone) cross border payments can be made as easily, quickly and cheaply as within 
existing domestic frameworks.  
To the extent that these initiatives may facilitate competition and entry, it is worth 
considering three specific aspects of this legislative and policy framework: price controls, 
minimum standards and legal harmonisation. 
Price controls. The Directive on cross border payments and related pressure on banks 
and other payment service providers have forced through decreases in fees (to end consumers) 
for small retail payments (value under 12,500€) . At most banks, published prices for credit 
transfers have declined in line with legislation. Price restrictions applied to this part of the 
downstream market will have two main effects on the upstream market. (1) They will tend to 
put downward pressure on supply (in-house or external). But all banks must continue to 
provide payment services, so unless they can cross-subsidise, inefficient banks will be forced 
to outsource these activities to more efficient wholesale providers of payment systems and 
services.  
 31The ensuing consolidation in the upstream market may improve prospects for new 
entrants in the downstream retail markets. If wholesale providers are not also worried about 
protecting their own retail banking activities, they may actively seek to expand their client 
base and happily supply payment services and access to new entrants. On the other hand, if 
consolidation is largely along national lines, there still may be a very limited supply of pan-
European payments processing services. If this situation arises, the benefits of consolidation 
may accrue primarily to those few banks that can efficiently serve several domestic markets.   
(2) Price controls will also put pressure on margins. If SEPA succeeds in lowering real 
costs for intra-European transfers, declining prices and margins for cross-border payments 
may act as a disincentive to new entrants in particular those whose comparative advantage 
focuses on being able to provide lower cost cross border payment services. The reasoning is 
simple. If prices and margins decline for incumbents, any new entrant hoping to compete in 
this market will see its expected return on investment decline. At some point, margins may 
fall so much that a new entrant will be entirely discouraged from developing a competing 
offer.  
 
Minimum standards. The new proposals also include a limit on settlement cycles, 
stipulating that credit transfers within the zone may (after 2010) take no longer than 48 hours 
(in practice less). This will have the effect of forcing participants to undertake investments, or 
side step obligations by outsourcing payments operations to specialists (who themselves will 
invest). Along with the beneficial effect of improving standards and delays, this too will have 
an effect on prices, supply and concentration of the industry. 
Normally, banks and other operators forced to invest would seek to recoup their outlay 
through either higher fees or higher volumes of business (or both). But as fees will probably 
continue to be subject to direct or indirect controls, more pressure will be put on supply. 
Payments ‘insourcers’ will seek to capture more of the market in order to operate profitably. 
Signs of consolidation are already beginning to appear as banks begin to sell off or outsource 
payments operations to other banks or specialists.  
The ensuing consolidation may indeed create gains in efficiency. But it will also be 
likely to concentrate market power in the hands of a few banking groups. New (and existing) 
retail banks may find it easier to enter new markets if they can transform previously fixed 
costs into external variable expenses. Like in the case of price controls, if consolidation 
among payments processors is largely national, a greater portion of efficiency gains may go to 
incumbents, with less passed on to retail institutions and their clients. Nationally focused 
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border payment services. This would not be favourable for the emergence of new entrants 
focused on developing a TEBA service.    
Unfortunately, if past experience in Europe is anything to go by, consolidation will be 
most pronounced within domestic markets, concentrating payments in the hands of a few 
dominant processors per country instead of fostering cross-border consolidation. Minimum 
standards may help achieve consolidation, but they will also hinder the emergence of new 
cross border competition.  
 
Harmonised legal and regulatory framework.  To the extent that cross border 
operations suffer from differences in legal and regulatory regimes, the proposal to create a 
common legal framework for payments is a step in the right direction. In particular, countries 
which restrict payments to full credit institutions can benefit from being forced to relax entry 
criteria. And clarifying the legal environment for cross-border payments, to minimise 
operational and contractual risks should bring down transactions cost for all. 
However, the proposed structures may still be too stringent. Payment providers will 
now have to seek a special license and go through the passporting procedure to operate in 
other countries (or set up a new subsidiary abroad and apply locally for authorisation). 
Although this may be the best one can hope for within the confines of the current EU 
regulatory framework, one cannot help feeling that the Commission has missed an 
opportunity here to introduce a simpler structure in which even the delays and uncertainties of 
passporting are avoided.  
Moreover, there should be no illusions about the capacity for new legal divisions 
between different financial service activities to foster the emergence of a corresponding 
industry structure. The proposed divisions between (1) payments services providers, (2) credit 
institutions and (3) e-money institutions (and of course other financial firms defined in EU 
legislation) are unlikely to ever reflect clear industry boundaries; and these categories are 
likely to become outdated in the not too distant future.  
By defining a new license category, the EU may have found a convenient way of 
forcing open markets that limit payments to credit institutions. But the real problem for new 
entrants relates to the uncertainty of how different authorities will view new business models 
(see related point VIII.D.). As the preceding discussion should have made clear, the 
interrelationship between retail banking and payment services are complex and very important 
to the success of new entrants in a pan-European market. It is also perhaps worthwhile 
 33recalling that funds transfer (and currency exchange) services were the origin of banking 
institutions that emerged in the middle ages. The way in which regulators define and interpret 
this boundary will have a potentially important impact on whether new entrants can test new 
models without getting bogged down in red tape and conflicting approaches across countries. 
The current proposal neglects this issue
41. 
 
VIII.B. Surcharge fees
No surcharge rules have attracted increasing attention from regulators, with the 
suspicion that they are anti-competitive or at least hinder retailers from using price variations 
to send the ‘right signals’ to consumers about the relative costs of different payment 
instruments. But there are many other ways in which competition can be pursued in spite of 
no-surcharge rules. Banning surcharges may not even lead to lower prices for consumers. 
Although surcharging might facilitate new entrants, its other negative consequences probably 
outweigh any positive effects.  
On the one hand, ‘no-surcharge rules’ do not prevent competition by other innovative 
means. Consumers already often face indirect price differences based on the payment 
instrument used by them. Retailers or card issuers may pay loyalty points to consumers. And 
the cost of interest free credit for limited periods of time is also a form of pricing.  
Perhaps another way in which retailers adjust is by setting minimum amounts for card 
payments. In many countries merchants will not accept payment by card for low values. On 
balance, this may very well induce consumers to spend more than they would in the absence 
of minimum amounts. 
On the other hand, if surcharges are allowed, there may be two particular effects. 
Experience to date suggests that merchants may find that differential pricing is not worth the 
effort. So even if they can impose different prices according to payment instrument, they may 
choose not to. This has been the experience for example in Australia for a large proportion of 
retailers. Modelling also suggests that for retailers with significant market power in their 
segment, the benefits of differential pricing will be disproportionately captured by them, with 
very little of the gains from price reductions going to consumers. 
The other possible effect would be to reduce acceptance, which might have a gradual 
impact on issuing. Merchants with a strong franchise might develop competing card solutions 
valid only in their stores. This would lead to fragmentation and possibly an increase in market 
power of retailers. 
                                                 
41 Another anomaly in the legislation is the continued carve out for post giro institutions, the history and impact 
of which requires further investigation. 
 34Another area in which no-surcharge rules have applied is on ATM withdrawals. Here 
the experience in the UK suggests that allowing surcharging on cash withdrawals can actually 
provide an incentive for independent ATM networks to be developed. This can be 
advantageous for new entrants, providing them with greater choice among third party 
networks for arranging ATM access. Experience also shows that, many customers, especially 
those classified as ‘cash rich, time poor’ are willing to pay a surcharge to be able to withdraw 
cash at a convenient site (e.g. airport, train station, petrol station) instead of making a special 
(time-consuming) trip to another bank’s ATM. 
But studies have shown (Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick) that surcharging on ATM 
withdrawals favours client acquisition by big established banks. Clients that appreciate wide 
access to ATMs gravitate to those with the biggest networks through which withdrawals can 
be made free of charge. So even in this case, on balance new entrants may not benefit from a 
growth in surcharging on ATMs. 
 
VIII.C. Facilitating stronger demand for a TEBA
Efforts to ‘improve’ supply of intra-European payment services can be wasted if 
demand for them remains weak. Of course it is more difficult to regulate consumer 
preferences than banks. But governments should be reviewing impediments and disincentives 
to using a cross-border account. A few issues stand out, some of which are partially addressed 
by current proposals. 
 
Salary payments to ‘foreign’ accounts 
There is some evidence from surveys that employers are still often very reluctant to 
pay salaries to an account abroad. As this is a primary use of a current account, it is 
particularly important that employees can if they so wish receive salary on an existing account 
held in another EU state. There seem to be a number of reasons why companies may refuse to 
do this. 
¾  legal risks: payments made to accounts abroad may present greater risks to employers 
if a dispute arises on confirmation of payment amounts or dates or if the company 
needs to recoup undue payments. In such cases, the inconsistencies or simple 
differences between legal systems and conventions may present unnecessary 
complications that a firm would rather avoid. National law may for example differ on 
key definitions such as “proof of payment”. Work on harmonisation of the legal 
framework in the EU for payments may help to alleviate some of these problems. 
 35¾  costs and delays: Salary may have to be paid by or on specific dates – either by 
contract or by law. Foreign transfers which not only take longer but are also less 
reliable in terms of timing may present significant problems for corporations and 
employees. Similarly, as the cost of a cross border payment has, until recently, 
exceeded that for domestic payments, both companies and employees may have 
considered foreign payments to be undesirable. Of course, improvements in these 
areas are already the focus of legislation. 
¾  Processing of tax forms and related documentation: Filing tax returns, managing 
pension rights and dealing with systems for social security (e.g. health, 
unemployment) may also require individuals to hold a domestic account. Salaries are 
often processed by external payroll companies that operate domestically, but may be 
unable to apply tax, social security or other rules to salary being paid abroad. 
 
Administrative documentation requirements:  
Many companies and public authorities rely on bank statements as proof of address, 
identity or available funds. Foreign bank statements and documentation may not be accepted 
for obvious reasons (language) or perhaps because formal guidelines and procedures do not 
recognise them as acceptable forms of documentation. Hence lack of a domestic bank account 
may create administrative complications for individuals, especially during the process of 
establishing residency, when this kind of documentation is frequently needed.  
 
 
VIII.D. The costs of regulatory uncertainty weigh most heavily on new entrants
In spite of attempts to coordinate and harmonise regulatory policy across Europe, 
national authorities still hold considerable discretionary powers, especially where new 
business models do not fit clearly into existing and familiar frameworks. For a business whose 
strategy relies on simultaneously capturing a small part of several national markets, regulatory 
uncertainty can be an impediment to its development.  
A TEBA provider might need to rely on gaining a number of clients in a number of 
countries in order to cover costs. But if regulators across Europe risk imposing different 
constraints and operational requirements on a new cross-border business model, the end result 
may be to discourage this kind of new entrant.  
It is precisely for new entrants and new business models, particularly those that rely on 
cross border economies of scale (to be profitable), that EU supervisors must be able provide 
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standards. Established incumbents can often absorb the extra costs and risks of divergent 
regulation. For new entrants the problems are more significant. Hence in an environment 
where increased competition and in particular innovative pan-European providers are 
welcome, regulatory uncertainty is all the more disappointing.  
 
VIII.E. Outsourcing: Regulators can do more to diminish the barriers posed by economies of 
scale.  
One of the more important developments in financial services over the last two 
decades has been the rise of outsourcing – both external and internal
42. Outsourcing has 
enabled parts of the value chain of financial services, especially those that are subject to 
economies of scale, to be provided at lower marginal cost to both internal and external clients. 
This has reduced barriers to entry and facilitated competition from new entrants. 
Outsourcing enables institutions to transform formerly fixed costs into variable costs. 
As the ratio of fixed to variable costs decline, new entrants are generally able to achieve break 
even at lower numbers of clients or a lower volume of business. This increases the chances of 
survival of new entrants and has a positive effect on competition, on pricing and service 
variety.  
    But regulatory authorities have only cautiously given way to outsourcing; and 
liberalisation in related services trade in the broader international setting is still warranted. 
The EU and national governments should as a first priority be reconsidering barriers to 
outsourcing, not only in familiar areas such as IT, custody and call centres, but also in terms 
of facilitating distribution of financial services via new channels (e.g. via other retail chains) 
and access to central infrastructure (such as payment systems) by non-banks such as 
corporates and retailers.  
The principals on outsourcing supported by the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors should be welcomed. But in practice, scope remains for divergent national 
interpretations. And anecdotal evidence suggests that the uneasy correspondence between 
rules and concrete banking practices can unintentionally impede outsourcing solutions or 
generate rents for outsourcing providers operating in a given national market. Ultimately, a 
single European supervisory framework will be the best way to ensure consistent, yet 
principals based, application of rules on outsourcing across multiple EU countries. 
                                                 
42 Internal ‘outsourcing’ refers to centralisation of activities and operations within the same institution, but 
serving multiple business and entities within a diversified group. 
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mutual recognition and equivalence of standards in order to widen the scope of potential 
suppliers to the financial industry and opportunities for new entrants to experiment with new 
business models. An accord with India for example could be mutually beneficial. While 
further improving access by IT companies to Europe, European banks could be provided with 
less restrictions on entry to the banking sector in India. This would also have an indirect 
advantage for European integration. It might increase the relative attraction of investment in 
Europe vis-à-vis emerging markets such as India. Restricted entry to the Indian market makes 
it more attractive to international banking groups that can pay the entry ticket and shoulder the 
risks involved. Providing wider access would perhaps refocus some banking groups interest 
on improving returns in Europe. 
 
VIII.F. Separation of merchant acquiring and card issuing 
More separation between issuing and acquiring banks might facilitate the introduction 
of new payment instruments. Although this form of vertical integration is not anti-competitive 
in itself, if issuers or acquirers exercise market power, if there is tacit collusion, new entrants 
may be blocked. In particular, if merchant acquirers also operate as retail banks and card 
issuers, access to provide new payment instruments may suffer. Establishing a banking 
relationship with merchants across Europe could be a problem for Vodafone. It is in this 
context that a partnership with a merchant acquirer would be advantageous. And it is also in 
this context that market barriers exist.  
In many countries across Europe, there is a high degree of vertical integration in retail 
payments, covering the card issuing, merchant acquisition and settlement components of the 
market. The recent interim findings on card systems by the European Competition Directorate 
at the Commission (April 12 2006) confirm this. If merchant acquirers have market power, 
i.e. individual companies can have an impact on prices, vertical integration may be profitable, 
and maybe even good from a social point of view
43. But integration may on the other hand 
hinder new entrants that wish to propose new payment instruments and innovations that pose 
a competitive threat to incumbents. Where vertical integration is profitable, this may be a 
further impediment to cross border retail banking integration.   
Luckily in some countries vertical integration is beginning to break down. Banks are 
increasingly outsourcing card processing and merchant acquisition responsibilities to third 
parties such as Euroconex, Atos, First Data and TSYS. But many still maintain these 
                                                 
43 See Rochet and Tirole (2000) where they briefly outline the implications of integration between acquiring and 
issuing service providers. 
 38functions ‘in-house’. This trend may reduce the risk that conflicts of interests impede new 
entrants to retail banking. 
Any mandatory separation of issuing and acquiring would be risky and unwarranted. 
In fact, as the market opens and once it becomes competitive, incentives for vertical 
integration ought to decrease, weakening the case for intervention. But authorities should 
ensure that vested corporate or government interests do not unduly block acquisitions or 
developments by independent merchant acquirers, especially in markets in which these 
activities are dominated by a small number of vertically integrated banking groups.  
 
VIII.G. EU Labour Mobility
Lastly, although is lies outside the realm of financial sector governance, it is worth 
emphasising inter-dependence with labour mobility and the impediments to it. These issues 
are well documented in other policy literature. Improvements to the portability of pensions, 
easier, less costly solutions for income tax on mobile individuals and aspects of employment 
law could all contribute to greater labour mobility within Europe. This would have a positive 
effect on demand for banking solutions serving a trans-European clientele. 
 
IX. Conclusions
 
Retail banking integration in Europe remains an elusive goal. As a step towards a 
market led process of creating a single retail market, policy makers should be hoping that a 
pan-European provider emerges, even if is seen as catering to a small population of relatively 
wealthy mobile Europeans. For a variety of reasons, mobile telephone operators with a broad 
geographical presence, such as Vodafone, would be in a better position than many existing 
retail banks to have both an incentive and good chance of exploiting this market niche. In any 
case, the integration of mobile telephony and banking services will happen. If the benefits of 
this innovation are not captured by incumbents, it could help foster European integration and 
the emergence of a pan-European retail banking service that targets this market – just the kind 
of people who value cross-border banking and are cognisant of the advantages of (and 
obstructions to) the single market. Policy makers should be trying to ensure that barriers to 
this sort of new entrant are minimised and that the fruits of innovation are duly passed on 
from banks to consumers. 
The paper has discussed many of the natural or economic barriers to new entrants in 
retail banking and outlined areas in which Vodafone would be well positioned to overcome 
 39them. Foremost among them are those related to the provision of payment services. In the 
oligopolistic banking markets of most European countries, pronounced vertical integration in 
this domain may limit opportunities for a new entrant to form partnerships. And innovations 
that might help propel the business model of a new entrant are hindered not only by the need 
for coordinated investment but also because the benefits of such innovations may be captured 
by incumbents in the retail banking community. These barriers are arguably more significant 
than legal and regulatory barriers that have been addressed by current European policies.  
EU policy has to acknowledge its limited scope, beyond direct industrial policy
44, to 
influence the final outcome. Policy measures do admittedly seem to be encouraging market 
consolidation in the payments sector. This could turn out to the benefit of pan-European 
business plans. But there is also a danger that consolidation will be mostly national, 
concentrating any efficiency gains in the hands of banks and firms that may not be under 
pressure to pass them on to consumers and businesses.  
Other areas in which authorities should concentrate efforts to enhance market 
openness include removal of regulations that unduly restrict innovations in outsourcing. 
Restrictions on access to participation in the payment system are being reconsidered, 
especially in the retail sector. And finally, demand for cross border services is still critically 
dependent on progress in other policy domains, in particular those that promote labour 
mobility.  
                                                 
44 It is perhaps worth noting that, if Europe were a developing country, western agencies might well engage in a 
public private partnership to support integration. Indeed, this is the form in which the UK development agency, 
DFID, has supported Vodafone’s MPesa project in Kenya. 
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 41Appendix 
 
Bi-lateral funds transfers: destinations as percentage of total messages sent (2004) 
 
 r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
eceiving country BE DE ES FR GB IE IT NL
elgium (BE) 6% 5% 11% 6% 4% 5% 18%
ermany (DE) 21% 28% 29% 26% 31% 39% 36%
pain (ES) 5% 7% 9% 8% 2% 6% 4%
rance (FR) 17% 14% 15% 14% 5% 14% 9%
reat Britain (GB) 13% 18% 19% 16% 42% 15% 14%
reland (IE) 1% 2% 1% 1% 5% 1% 1%
taly (IT) 8% 16% 13% 14% 10% 3% 6%
e t h e r l a n d s  ( N L ) 1 9 %9 %5 %6 %8 %5 %5 %
otal intra-European 
raffic by sender 
sd) 7 940 24 640 5 514 10 932 14 453 1 807 9 265 10 527
traffic for selected 
eceiving countries 
(as % of total) 84% 73% 86% 86% 77% 93% 84% 86%
rce: SWIFT 2004
*intra-European is defined as traffic between the 15 'old' EU member states, minus Greece, plus Norway and Switzerland
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Type 100 messages received by selected countries as percent of total 'intra-European'* traffic by sender 
Some indicative price structures for basic retail payment instruments 
 
France (prices as of 01.01.2006) 
All prices 
in Euros 
Card 
payments 
free in Euro 
zone 
Minimum annual 
card fee at which 
withdrawals are 
free  
(carte premier) 
(immediate versus 
end of month 
debit) 
Minimum 
annual card 
fee 
 (for visa 
classic card)  
immediate 
/end of month 
debit 
Number of free 
withdrawals (for 
basic card) 
Price of 
subsequent 
withdrawals 
Young 
person’s 
tariff 
(national 
payment 
card) 
CIC  
(Ile de 
France) 
yes 121 34 4 1 
Banque 
Populaire  
yes 95 31 / 40.8 4 1 
HSBC yes 123 33 4 1 
Crédit 
Lyonnais 
yes 123 34.50 4 1 
BNP 
Paribas 
yes 128 36 / 45 6 or 8 1  18
SG  yes 112 / 122 32 / 42 8 or 4 1  -50% 
*It should be noted that clients of French retail banks often report scope for negotiating reductions to the 
published fees, suggesting that banks maintain room for further price competition. 
**Accounts are not remunerated unless indicated 
 
Germany 
All prices in Euros p.a.  EC Card Basic visa or MC Gold Card
Deutsche Bank  free / 5 (a) 20.45 60.47
HVB  free 20 (MC) 30 (Visa) 60
Commerzbank  free 13 ot 20 € (b) 46 to 66 € (b)
(a)  free for certain account types and minimum average balances 
(b)  free for card holder spending over €5900 for std cards or €11900 per year for ‘gold’ cards 
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